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“[T]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, 
 and for his widow, and his orphan . . . .” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Circuit is the highest court to which veterans can 
appeal by right for benefits.  In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided 
eighty-seven veterans cases (twelve percent of its overall docket).  
Twenty-six of those decisions were precedential opinions.  There are 
approximately 23.4 million veterans in the United States, more than 
three million of whom receive disability compensation.2  And with 
two ongoing wars, plans to increase the size of the Army and Marine 
Corps, and recent legislation impacting the veterans claims process, 
                                        
 2. NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STATISTICS, VA BENEFITS & HEALTH CARE 
UTILIZATION, Aug. 3, 2009, available at http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/docs/4X6_ 
summer09_sharepoint.pdf. 
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the Federal Circuit will likely see an increase in veterans cases in the 
coming years.3 
Part I of this article summarizes the eligibility criteria for veterans 
benefits and the process by which a veteran’s claim reaches the 
Federal Circuit.  Part II explains the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit with respect to veterans cases.  Part III analyzes one Supreme 
Court and nine Federal Circuit cases from 2009 that are important to 
veterans benefits practitioners.  These cases address, inter alia, issues 
that arise from the Department of Veterans Affairs’s duty to assist 
veterans with their claims, whether veterans have a Fifth Amendment 
due process right to a claim for benefits, equitable tolling of the 
deadlines for appealing benefits decisions, and the retroactive 
assignment of disability ratings. 
I. ELIGIBILITY AND THE CLAIMS PROCESS 
By the time a veteran’s case reaches the Federal Circuit, it has 
traveled a long road that usually involves multiple medical 
examinations,4 at least one administrative hearing and administrative 
appeal, and review by a federal appellate court.5  But before we 
summarize that process, it is important to understand who is eligible 
to begin it. 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) defines a veteran as  
“a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and 
who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other 
than dishonorable.”6  The “active” portion of the definition is satisfied 
by anyone in the active duty military.  National Guard members and 
Reservists, however, are not automatically deemed veterans.7  They 
must either be activated for “federal” service (as opposed to service to 
                                        
 3. See, e.g., What’s Ahead for Soldiers in 2010, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/01/army_fivethings3_010310w/ (discussing 
the troop surge in Afghanistan, “where more casualties are expected as the troop 
presence grows”); John Feffer, Obama:  The Goldilocks President, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, Jan. 23, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/obama-the-
goldilocks-pres_b_428971.html (discussing recent increases in the size of the Army 
and Marine Corps and military spending). 
 4. Although there are several different types of claims that veterans may file 
(e.g., survivor benefits, education benefits, etc.), this article focuses only on medical 
disability claims because they constitute the vast majority of claims for benefits and 
are thus most pertinent to the Federal Circuit. 
 5. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is the only court that 
may review decisions of the Board of Veterans Appeals.  See infra notes 29–34 and 
accompanying text. 
 6. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006) (emphasis added); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 7. 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(b). 
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their state government)8 or be injured or killed during non-federal 
service.9  Accordingly, a member of a Reserve unit that deploys to 
Afghanistan would meet the requirement, whereas a member of a 
Reserve unit that mobilizes pursuant to a state order to assist with a 
natural disaster generally would not. 
The other element in the definition of “veteran”—a discharge 
under conditions other than dishonorable—is not as straightforward 
as it may seem because, contrary to Hollywood depictions, there are 
more than just “honorable” and “dishonorable” discharges.  Rather, 
the types of discharge include:  (1) honorable discharge;  
(2) discharge under honorable conditions; (3) discharge under other 
than honorable conditions; (4) bad conduct discharge; and  
(5) dishonorable discharge.10  As the names suggest, the first two 
types of discharge are good; they result in “veteran” status for benefits 
purposes.  The last three types of discharge, however, are bad.   
In fact, a dishonorable discharge is a bar to attaining the status of 
veteran for benefits purposes.11  The other two “bad” discharges, 
however, do not automatically bar a person from obtaining the status 
of veteran.  If a person receives either a discharge under other than 
honorable conditions or a bad conduct discharge and applies for 
veterans benefits, the VA adjudicates the facts surrounding the 
discharge and reviews the applicant’s entire service history to 
determine eligibility to receive veterans benefits.12 
Once an applicant attains “veteran” status, the applicant can obtain 
disability benefits from the VA by demonstrating:  “(1) the existence 
of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a 
disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present 
disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during 
service.”13 
                                        
 8. Id. § 3.7(o)(1) (stating that a person “ordered into service” may be eligible 
for benefits). 
 9. 38 U.S.C. § 101(24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a). 
 10. See BARTON F. STICHMAN ET AL., VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 20.2 (2007). 
 11. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d). 
 12. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12. 
 13. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. 
Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (applying 
to wartime and peacetime service, respectively, and stating that there is a 
presumption of sound condition when enrolled for service).  There is no statute of 
limitations for filing claims.  Accordingly, some veterans file claims many years after 
leaving active service, sometimes because they do not begin to experience symptoms 
until later in life.  Obviously, the more time that has passed between active service 
and filing, the harder it is to prove that a current disability is connected to active 
service. 
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The veteran must prove those elements under the “benefit of the 
doubt” standard.14  Under that standard, if the evidence regarding a 
claim is in an “approximate balance of positive and negative . . . the 
[VA] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”15   
The claims process is not meant to be adversarial.  To the contrary, 
the statute imposes a long list of obligations on the VA to assist 
veterans in presenting their claims by, for example, notifying veterans 
of evidence necessary to complete their claim and making reasonable 
efforts to obtain records in the government’s possession.16 
The injury or illness, however, cannot be the result of the veteran’s 
own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs.17  For example, 
if an active duty service member robs a bank and during the robbery 
is shot by the police and paralyzed, the injury would be deemed to be 
due to the individual’s own misconduct.  Accordingly, regardless of 
the military discharge received, the service member would not be 
entitled to disability compensation or treatment from the VA for the 
paralysis. 
A claim for disability benefits goes to one of fifty-eight VA Regional 
Offices, which examines the claim to determine whether the claimant 
meets the definition of a veteran and whether he or she has a 
compensable injury or illness related to military service.18  The VA 
must presume that the illness is not due to the veteran’s own 
misconduct or drug or alcohol abuse.19  If there is evidence to suggest 
that the illness is due to misconduct, the VA may rebut the 
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.20  If the claimant is 
                                        
 14. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 
 15. Id.; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (mandating that if a “reasonable doubt arises . . . 
such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant”). 
 16. See, e.g., Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 
§ 5103A, 114 Stat. 2096, 2097 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 5102–5103A, 
5107).  The VA’s duty to assist veterans in filing claims pre-dates the VCAA, but the 
VCAA was enacted in order to redefine and clarify the VA’s duties. 
 17. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(b). 
 18. See generally DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS 
DEPENDENTS & SURVIVORS (2009), available at http://www1.va.gov/opa/vadocs/ 
fedben.pdf (describing the process and requirements for submitting a claim). 
 19. 38 U.S.C. § 105(a); see, e.g., Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 241, 244 (Ct. Vet. 
App. 1992) (“[B]ecause [the veteran] was in the active naval service, his injuries are 
deemed to have been in line of duty . . . .”); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting the presumption that a disease or injury first manifested or 
aggravated during active duty is service-connected). 
 20. E.g., Smith, 2 Vet. App. at 244 (citing Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54 
(Ct. Vet. App. 1990) (requiring the Government to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the injuries in question were not sustained in the line of duty); Thomas 
v. Nicholson, 423 F.3d 1279, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Thus, we find that 
preponderance of the evidence is the proper evidentiary standard necessary to rebut 
a § 105(a) presumption . . . .”). 
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deemed a “veteran” under the statute and regulations and has a 
compensable disability, the Regional Office determines the severity of 
the disability (expressed as a percentage designed to account for the 
“average impairments of earning capacity resulting from such injuries 
in civil occupations”)21 and assigns a date in the past that the disability 
took effect.22  The severity of the disability (i.e., the “rating” 
percentage) and the effective dates are fertile sources of litigation. 
Another fertile source of litigation stems from the VA reducing 
ratings after the initial rating or denying a veteran’s claim for an 
increased rating.  Because most injuries and illnesses are not static, 
the VA may conduct follow-up examinations or the veteran may 
submit a claim for an increased rating.  For example, a veteran may 
qualify for a 70% disability during a certain time interval when his 
disability is especially potent, but that disability may subsequently 
improve and be commensurate with only a 40% rating, or vice-versa.  
The Federal Circuit has noted that, “[o]ver a period of many years, a 
veteran’s disability claim may require reratings in accordance with 
changes in . . . his or her physical or mental condition.”23 
The veteran can appeal any portion of the VA’s disability findings 
(for both initial claims and subsequent ratings)24 by filing with the VA 
a notice of disagreement.25  The veteran is entitled to retain counsel 
and to an informal hearing in front of a Decision Reviewing Officer 
(DRO) at the VA Regional Office.26  If the veteran disagrees with the 
DRO’s findings, the veteran is entitled to a “formal” appeal to the 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA),27 where the veteran may request a 
                                        
 21. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; see also 38 C.F.R. pt. 4 (discussing the general policies 
regarding disabilities ratings). 
 22.  E.g., Moore v. Shinseki, 555 F.3d 1369, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing 
the history of a claim that included several adjustments to the effective date). 
 23. Id. at 1373 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.1). 
 24. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (stating that all decisions made by the Secretary are 
subject to review); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.1 (establishing the BVA).  See generally  
38 C.F.R. pt. 19 (outlining the regulations for the BVA). 
 25. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. 
 26. Id. § 3.103.  Current law prohibits a veteran from retaining paid counsel at 
any step in the claims process before the notice of disagreement is filed.   
See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c) (2006) (providing that, with limited exceptions, “a fee may 
not be charged, allowed, or paid for services of agents and attorneys with respect to 
services provided before the date on which a notice of disagreement is filed”).  This 
prohibition on representation has been frequently criticized as, among other things, 
contributing to the inefficiency of the claims process, see Matthew J. Dowd, Note,  
No Claim Adjudication Without Representation:  A Criticism of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c), 16 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 53, 71–78 (2006), and costing individual veterans thousands of dollars in 
benefits, if not more, see Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying 
Disabled Veterans the Freedom to Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 446–57 (2010). 
 27. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3)–(5); 38 C.F.R. § 20.202. 
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hearing.28  If the veteran disagrees with the BVA, he or she may 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC).29 
The CAVC was established in 1988 pursuant to Article I of the 
United States Constitution30 to provide an “impartial judicial forum 
for review of administrative decisions . . . that are adverse to the 
veteran-appellant’s claim.”31  It has “exclusive jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the [BVA].”32  Despite this nation’s tradition of having 
courts review administrative agency determinations, there was almost 
no review of VA determinations before Congress established the 
CAVC.33  Veterans may appeal final decisions of the CAVC to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.34 
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION OVER VETERANS CLAIMS 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in the area of veterans law is 
narrow but significant.  The court has two jurisdictional bases for 
exercising review.  First, the court may hear appeals from decisions of 
the CAVC, but it may only decide purely legal questions.35  Essentially, 
the Federal Circuit acts as a secondary appellate court over the 
CAVC.  This makes it the only federal appellate court besides the 
Supreme Court to review the decisions of another federal appellate 
court.36  Second, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over 
challenges to VA rules and regulations under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.37 
As a result of this unique jurisdictional scheme, the Federal Circuit 
“does not issue very many precedential opinions in the area of 
veterans law,” but those that is does issue “are usually quite 
important.”38 
                                        
 28. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 13.2. 
 29. 38 U.S.C. § 7252. 
 30. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). 
 31. U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Welcome, http:// 
www.uscourts.cavc.gov (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 32. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). 
 33. See STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 15.1.1 (“[D]uring most of the twentieth 
century decisions of the [VA] . . . were exempt from court review.”).  Nothing, 
however, precluded a veteran from challenging the constitutionality of VA decisions.  
See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (“Plainly, no explicit provision of  
§ 211(a) bars judicial consideration of appellee’s constitutional claims.”). 
 34. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 
 35. Id. § 7292(d). 
 36. See infra note 39. 
 37. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). 
 38. Chief Judge Glenn Archer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,  
The Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Veterans 
Appeals (Oct. 17–18, 1994), in 8 Vet. App. CXCI (1996). 
  
1162 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1155 
A.  Federal Circuit Review of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
Federal Circuit review of the CAVC is unusual because the latter is 
itself an appellate court.39  Perhaps as a partial consequence, very few 
veterans claims are successfully appealed to the Federal Circuit.40  
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over CAVC appeals is 
limited to review of issues of pure law.41  Indeed, the Federal Circuit is 
specifically prohibited from entertaining “a challenge to a factual 
determination” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to 
the facts of a particular case,” except insofar as such facts present a 
constitutional issue.42  To date, this unusual bar on the Federal 
Circuit’s review of non-constitutional facts in veterans cases has 
withstood challenges on the rationale that such cases are still given 
three levels of factual review by administrative bodies and lower 
courts, including the CAVC.43 
The prohibition on reviewing any non-constitutional facts 
significantly limits the number of veterans appeals heard by the 
Federal Circuit.44  However, the Federal Circuit’s appellate 
jurisdiction over legal issues includes authority to review the validity 
and proper interpretation of statutes and regulations upon which the 
CAVC relies in reaching a judgment, as well as the ability to review 
other legal issues that are not derived from a statute or regulation.45  
In other words, the Federal Circuit exercises appellate review over all 
                                        
 39. See Letter from William P. Greene, Jr., Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims, to John J. Hall, Chairman, Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & 
Memorial Affairs, Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives  
(June 5, 2007), available at http://veterans.house.gov/Media/File/110/5-22-07/ 
courtofappealsfollow-up.htm (discussing the benefits of additional federal appellate 
review of CAVC decisions); see also Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals 
for Veterans Claims at Twenty:  A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider Its Future, 
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 380 (2009) (“[T]here is no other situation in the federal 
court system in which the decisions of one appellate body are subject to review as of 
right in another appellate body, other than the Supreme Court”). 
 40. Of the approximately “half of one percent of cases [that] are appealed to the 
CAVC, . . . the number of veterans appeals that the Federal Circuit hears on the 
merits is negligible compared to the overall volume of [veterans] claims.”  James D. 
Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:  Confronting the New 
Complexities of VA Adjudication, 65 ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=james_ridgway 
 41. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (d)(1). 
 42. Id. § 7292(d)(2). 
 43. See, e.g., Bradley v. Nicholson, 181 Fed. App’x 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2006),  
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 887 (2006) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s limited 
jurisdiction does not deprive veterans of equal protection). 
 44. See, e.g., Archer, supra note 38, at CLXXXVI–CXCI (noting that “about 80 
percent of the [CAVC] cases appealed to our court so far have been jurisdictionally 
defective”). 
 45. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 
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questions of law raised in CAVC decisions, including judicially 
created rules of law, but not over non-constitutional facts.46 
The Federal Circuit applies a de novo standard of review to legal 
questions decided by the CAVC and has broad latitude to overturn 
laws, statutes, regulations, or interpretations thereof, if they are 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unconstitutional, 
contrary to statute, in excess of statutory authority, without 
observance of procedure required by law, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.47 
The leading practitioners’ guide on veterans law identifies three 
“potential roadblocks” to obtaining Federal Circuit review of legal 
issues in CAVC decisions.48  First, the issue on appeal must be 
carefully framed as one solely of legal interpretation, rather than 
application of law to facts.49  Second, the issue being appealed is more 
likely to be heard if it was “relied upon” by CAVC in its decision.50  
Third, and finally, the issue being appealed generally should have 
been raised in the lower courts.51 
                                        
 46. Recent cases illustrate the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over issues of law, but 
not fact.  Compare Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1308 n.5 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (allowing review of a facial challenge to VA regulations),  
with Kokenge v. Nicholson, 179 Fed. App’x 31, 32 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (dismissing a 
service connection claim because it challenged the application of laws and 
regulations and not the law or statutes themselves), and Kince v. Nicholson, 161 Fed. 
App’x 938, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal 
claiming alleged misinterpretation of medical records). 
 47. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(d)(1). 
 48. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 15.8.1.6–7. 
 49. Id. at 1269–71 (citing Cook v. Principi, 353 F.3d 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); 
see also Ferguson v. Principi, 273 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction does not extend to review of challenges to the 
application of a law or  specific factual determinations); Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 
1477, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Congress has provided that our authority to review the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Appeals is restricted to entertaining 
appeals that seek review of the validity of any statute or regulation, or any 
interpretations thereof, or that raise constitutional controversies.”). 
 50. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1271–72.  But see Morgan v. Principi,  
327 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that “in a case such as this, in which 
the decision below regarding a governing rule of law would have been altered by 
adopting the position being urged, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the matter, 
even though the issue underlying the stated position was not ‘relied on’ by the 
Veterans Court”). 
 51. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1272–73.  This is a prudential rather than 
jurisdictional bar, with recognized judicial exceptions in the case of new intervening 
statutes, novel interpretations of existing law, pro se litigants, and unraised legal 
issues that are nonetheless necessary to consider a legal issue properly raised below.  
Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1338, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that 
“even when jurisdiction exists, prudential considerations should severely limit the 
exercise of our authority to consider issues not raised or decided below”). 
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B. Federal Circuit Review of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction to review challenges to VA 
“regulations, rules of procedure, substantive rules of general 
applicability, statements of general policy and interpretations of 
general applicability, including opinions and interpretations [by the 
Department’s General Counsel]. ”52  This jurisdiction is governed by 
the review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and acts as 
a relatively expedient alternative to the much lengthier VA 
administrative appeals process.53  There is, however, one significant 
statutory exception to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review VA 
regulations:  the adoption or revision of the VA disability rating 
schedule may only be reviewed by the Federal Circuit on 
constitutional grounds.54 
C. Procedural Limits On Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Over Veterans Claims 
Beyond the substantive limitations on the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over appeals from the CAVC and direct review of VA 
rules and regulations, certain procedural practices also affect Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over veterans claims.  Veterans must appeal 
judgments of the CAVC within sixty days to be heard by the Federal 
Circuit.55  Additionally, as a general rule, only final decisions of the 
CAVC can be appealed.  In Williams v. Principi,56 however, the Federal 
Circuit promulgated a three-part test to allow for very limited appeals 
of non-final CAVC decisions where the proceeding has been 
remanded to the Board of Veterans Appeals.57  First, there must be  
“a clear and final decision of a legal issue that . . . is separate from the 
remand proceedings.”58  The CAVC’s final decision on this legal issue 
must be dispositive—either directly governing the remand 
proceedings or rendering them unnecessary.59  Second, the CAVC’s 
resolution of the legal issue “must adversely affect the party seeking 
review.”60  Finally, “there must be a substantial risk that the decision 
                                        
 52. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1273. 
 53. See 38 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (stating that direct challenges to actions of the 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs may be brought in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06). 
 54. See id.; see also Nyeholt v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 298 F.3d 1350, 1353  
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent an express provision that such review is prohibited, we 
read the legislative history . . . as confirming our view that Congress did not intend to 
preclude constitutional challenges from review under § 502.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Ayers v. Peake, 274 Fed. App’x 882, 882–83 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 56. 275 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 57. Id. at 1364. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand proceeding may 
moot the issue.”61  All three prongs of the Williams test must be met 
for the Federal Circuit to exercise jurisdiction over a case that has 
been remanded by the CAVC.62 
The Federal Circuit has also adopted a standard to determine 
when it has jurisdiction in a case with multiple claims remanded by 
the CAVC, where some claims have been fully decided.  Specifically, 
the court held in Elkins v. Gober63 that if the various claims are not 
intertwined and the exercise of jurisdiction would not “disrupt the 
orderly process of adjudicat[ing]” the remanded claims, then the 
fully decided claims may be appealed.64 
III. ONE SUPREME COURT AND  NINE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES FROM 
2009 THAT VETERANS BENEFITS PRACTITIONERS SHOULD KNOW 
The Federal Circuit issued twenty-four precedential veterans law 
opinions in 2009.  Below is a summary and analysis of the cases that 
are especially important to veterans benefits practitioners because 
they address particularly important issues or issues that recur 
frequently.  Several cases address, under various fact patterns, the 
VA’s obligation to assist veterans with their claims, including where a 
veteran suffers from a psychiatric disorder.  Although the VA’s 
obligation to assist veterans with their claims is not new, the Veterans 
Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) represents Congress’s attempt 
to clarify the VA’s obligations.65  Not surprisingly, the VCAA has 
triggered much litigation.  Other cases discussed below address, inter 
alia, whether a veteran has a Fifth Amendment due process right to a 
claim for benefits, equitable tolling of the deadline for appeal to the 
CAVC, the statutory presumptions that accompany every veteran’s 
claim and the role those presumptions play in establishing a claim, 
and the retroactive assignment of disability ratings. 
                                        
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270, 1272, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal because the legal 
issues on appeal meet each prong laid out in Williams); Myore v. Principi, 323 F.3d 
1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that there was no final appealable order 
because there was no substantial risk that the issue would not survive remand and, 
therefore, dismissing the appeal). 
 63. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 64. Id. at 1375–76 (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. 
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). 
 65. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations laid out 
in the VCAA). 
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We begin with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shinseki v. Sanders,66 
which reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision in Sanders v. Nicholson.67 
A. Shinseki v. Sanders 
The VA claims process is unique compared to most other federal 
agency proceedings.  Instead of opposing claims or remaining 
neutral, the VA has a duty to assist veterans in developing benefits 
claims. 68  The VCAA is one codification of that duty and is mirrored 
in VA regulations, which direct the VA to provide claimants with 
notice of:  (1) what further information is necessary to substantiate 
the claim (“Type One” notice); (2) what portions of that information 
the VA will obtain for the claimant (“Type Two” notice); and (3) what 
portions the claimant must obtain (“Type Three” notice).69  At the 
time of the Federal Circuit’s Sanders decision, the regulations also 
required the VA to tell the claimant that he or she could submit any 
other relevant information that the claimant had available (“Type 
Four” notice).70 
Sanders concerned competing frameworks, one used by the CAVC 
and another used by the Federal Circuit, for addressing errors in 
providing these four types of notice.  The Supreme Court found the 
Federal Circuit’s framework for addressing VA notice deficiencies to 
be “too complex and rigid,” with presumptions that “impose[d] 
unreasonable evidentiary burdens,” and conflicted with “established 
[statutory] law.”71 
Sanders involved two veterans with different medical conditions, but 
who both alleged that they had received insufficient notice from the 
VA.  Petitioner Woodrow Sanders was a veteran of World War II who 
claimed that a bazooka explosion in 1944 precipitated blindness in 
his right eye years later.72  Although his 1945 service discharge 
examination showed near-perfect vision, Sanders filed a claim for 
disability benefits after a 1948 eye examination revealed an 
inflammation causing near blindness.73  The VA denied the claim in 
1949 for lack of a service connection.74  At Sanders’s urging, the VA 
                                        
 66. 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). 
 67. 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 
1696 (2009). 
 68. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (2006). 
 69. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009). 
 70. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1700–01 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1)). 
 71. Id. at 1700.  
 72. Id. at 1701. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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reopened his claim in 1992 and, following a medical examination, 
denied it again.75  Another medical examination and BVA review 
followed, resulting in another denial.76  On appeal, the CAVC found 
merit in Sanders’s arguments that the VA failed to provide proper 
Type Two notice (evidence the VA will obtain) and Type Three 
notice (evidence Sanders had to obtain).77  The CAVC held, however, 
that the errors were harmless because Sanders had not identified 
what different evidence he would have produced or asked the VA to 
produce.78 
The second petitioner, Patricia Simmons, applied for disability 
benefits for a claimed service-related hearing loss in her left ear 
following her discharge from active duty in April 1980.79   
In November 1980, the VA denied her claim on the basis that the 
injury was not sufficiently severe.80  The VA reopened the claim in 
1998 after Simmons provided medical records showing further 
hearing loss in her left ear, along with allegedly related hearing loss 
in her right ear.81  Following additional hearing examinations, 
however, the VA once again concluded that Simmons’s hearing loss 
in her left ear was not severe enough to qualify for benefits and that 
the hearing loss in her right ear was unrelated to service and not 
severe enough to qualify for benefits.82  The BVA affirmed; Simmons 
appealed to the CAVC.83  On appeal, Simmons also alleged a lack of 
notice by the VA regarding a scheduled medical examination as well 
as a Type One notice error for failing to tell her what further 
information was needed to substantiate her claim.84  The CAVC found 
merit in both of her claims and held both errors to be prejudicial.85 
The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and held that when the 
VA’s notice to a claimant is deficient in any respect, the error is 
presumed to be prejudicial.86  The Federal Circuit further held that it 
is the VA’s burden to show that the error did not affect the essential 
fairness of the adjudication, either by demonstrating actual 
knowledge of the defect by the claimant or that the benefit could not 
                                        
 75. Id. at 1702. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1703. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1702–04. 
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have been awarded as a matter of law.87  Under this framework, the 
Federal Circuit ruled in favor of both petitioners, reversing the 
CAVC’s decision against Sanders and affirming the judgment in favor 
of Simmons.88 
The Supreme Court found the Federal Circuit’s “presumption of 
prejudice” framework legally inconsistent with the statutory 
requirement that the CAVC “take due account of the rule of 
prejudicial error.”89  Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer concluded 
that the statutory “prejudicial error” edict compelled application of 
the “same kind of ‘harmless-error’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in 
civil cases.”90  In the majority’s view, this interpretation was bolstered 
by congruity between the statutory language governing the CAVC and 
an identical provision in the Administrative Procedure Act, as well the 
CAVC’s legislative history.91 
Adopting this familiar “harmless-error” rule, the Supreme Court 
found the Federal Circuit’s framework to be flawed on three 
grounds.92  First, the Court held that the Federal Circuit effectively 
created a mandatory presumption that deviated from the typical case-
specific application of judgment.93  Second, the Court found that the 
Federal Circuit imposed an unreasonably high evidentiary burden on 
the VA to prove a lack of prejudice, noting that requiring the 
government to demonstrate a claimant’s state of mind was “difficult, 
perhaps impossible.”94  Finally, the Court faulted the Federal Circuit 
for requiring the VA, rather than the claimant, to explain why the 
error was harmless.95  Under the Court’s view, the party that seeks to 
set aside a ruling typically bears the burden of demonstrating 
prejudice.96 Consequently, the Court struck down the Federal 
Circuit’s framework and reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment 
regarding Sanders, while remanding the Simmons proceeding.97 
Two implications of Sanders are particularly noteworthy for 
practitioners of veterans law.  First, VA failures to provide notice will 
                                        
 87. Id. at 1702–03. 
 88. Id. at 1703. 
 89. Id. at 1704 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (2006)). 
 90. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of 
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the 
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties.”). 
 91. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1704. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1704–05. 
 94. Id. at 1705. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1708. 
  
2010] TEN 2009 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW CASES 1169 
not result in a presumption in favor of veterans.  Rather, veterans will 
bear the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error.  Second, CAVC 
biases in assessing prejudicial error will guide the success of claims.  
Under CAVC precedent, Type One notice errors (further 
information required to substantiate a claim) are more likely to be 
prejudicial whereas Type Two (evidence the VA will obtain) and Type 
Three (evidence the veteran must obtain) notice errors are not.98   
As a result, veterans will likely have a higher success rate at the CAVC 
with Type One notice errors than with others. 
B. Henderson v. Shinseki99 
In this divisive and highly significant case, the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of equitable tolling where a claimant wishes to 
appeal a final decision of the BVA to the CAVC.100  Under 38 U.S.C.  
§ 7266(a), veterans have a 120-day deadline following the mailing of a 
notice of decision from the BVA to appeal that decision to the 
CAVC.101  Longstanding Federal Circuit precedent had allowed the 
CAVC to toll this 120-day deadline for equitable reasons, effectively 
creating a good-cause exception to the statutory deadline.102  The sole 
issue decided in Henderson was whether cases allowing equitable 
tolling were still valid in light of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision 
in Bowles v. Russell, which held that the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal in a civil case was a jurisdictional requirement not subject to 
equitable tolling.103 
Henderson held that the 120-day statutory deadline for appeals to 
the CAVC is a notice of appeal, or time of review, provision in a civil 
case, which is jurisdictional and therefore cannot be tolled without 
congressional authorization.104  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Federal Circuit explicitly overruled two prior decisions, Bailey v. 
West105 and Jaquay v. Principi,106 which had collectively established the 
authority of the CAVC to permit tolling in actions filed before it.107   
In explaining this reversal, the Henderson majority concluded that 
                                        
 98. See id. at 1703 (noting that “Type One notice error has the ‘natural effect of 
producing prejudice’”). 
 99. 589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 100. Id. at 1205. 
 101. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006). 
 102. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1203 (discussing cases that permitted equitable tolling 
under 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a)). 
 103. Id.; Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007). 
 104. Id. at 1220. 
 105. 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 106. 304 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 107. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1203. 
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those cases “have been overtaken by subsequent authority, 
specifically, Bowles, where the Supreme Court unequivocally stated 
that ‘the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 
jurisdictional requirement’ and that it had ‘no authority to create 
equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.’”108 
Daniel Henderson served on active duty from 1950 to 1952.109  
Following a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, he was discharged 
and received a 100% disability rating.110  Due to a need for in-home 
care, Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the VA 
in August of 2001.111  The Regional Office denied that claim, and 
Henderson appealed to the BVA, which denied the claim on August 
30, 2004.112  Henderson appealed the BVA’s denial to the CAVC on 
January 12, 2005—fifteen days after the 120-day statutory period had 
run.113  Henderson explained to the CAVC that the “failure to timely 
appeal was a direct result” of his medical condition and requested 
equitable tolling under Bailey.114  In March of 2006, a single judge of 
the CAVC held that equitable tolling was inappropriate and dismissed 
Henderson’s appeal.115  The Supreme Court then decided Bowles, and 
a divided three-judge panel of the CAVC relied on Bowles to once 
again dismiss Henderson’s claim as untimely.116  The en banc Federal 
Circuit affirmed the CAVC decision and overruled Bailey and 
Jaquay.117 
The Federal Circuit commenced its analysis in Henderson by 
reviewing Bailey and Jaquay.  In Bailey, an en banc Federal Circuit 
interpreted the § 7266(a) 120-day notice of appeal provision as a 
“time of review provision,” which was typically construed as 
“mandatory and jurisdictional.”118  However, the court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,119 
which dealt with an ostensibly analogous statute of limitations, to 
hold that equitable tolling was not barred in the absence of 
                                        
 108. Id. at 1220 (citing Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214). 
 109. Id. at 1203. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1204. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1203. 
 118. Id. at 1206 (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)). 
 119. 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (holding that the same rebuttable presumption of 
equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should apply to suits 
against the United States). 
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congressional expression to that effect.120  Jaquay cemented the effect 
of Bailey by applying this equitable tolling exception to grant relief to 
a veteran who incorrectly filed a motion for reconsideration of his 
final BVA decision with the VA rather than the CAVC.121 
Against this backdrop of settled case law, the Henderson court  
(a nine-judge majority of the Federal Circuit) held that the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Bowles mandated a revision of precedent.122   
In Bowles, a U.S. district court permitted a federal habeas petitioner 
seventeen days to file a notice of appeal—three days more than 
allowed by statue and under the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.123  The Supreme Court held that the statutory limit on the 
period for appeal was more than a “claim-processing rule”; it was 
mandatory and jurisdictional.124  Applying Bowles to the issue in 
Henderson, the Federal Circuit majority concluded that Bowles had 
abrogated the holding of Bailey, which permitted equitable tolling of 
the deadline for appeal to the CAVC.125  Accordingly, the court held, 
§ 7266(a) is a time of review provision and timely filing a notice of 
appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.126 
The Henderson decision carries enormous implications for 
practitioners of veterans law.  While the decision only affects appeals 
to the CAVC, it is significant nonetheless because, as Judge Mayer 
noted in dissent, “[i]t is the veteran who incurs the most devastating 
service-connected injury who will often be the least able to comply 
with rigidly enforced filing deadlines.”127  Given its harsh and 
controversial result, Henderson (as well as Bowles) may be subject to 
future judicial or legislative revision.  Currently, however, the 
Henderson decision repudiates more than a decade of judicial support 
for equitable tolling in appeals to the CAVC, and imposes an 
inflexible requirement of compliance with the 120-day deadline for 
appeals under § 7266(a). 
                                        
 120. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1206 (citing Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1364  
(Fed. Cir. 1998, overruled by Henderson, 589 F.3d 1201). 
 121. Id. at 1203 (citing Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1278 (2002)). 
 122. Id. at 1216. 
 123. Id. at 1209 (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207 (2007)). 
 124. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213. 
 125. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1220. 
 126. Id.  In reaching its decision, the Henderson court rejected three arguments:  
(1) that § 7266(a) was analogous to a statute of limitations provision rather than a 
jurisdictional time review provision and therefore was governed by Irwin rather than 
Bowles; (2) that Bowles should be limited to Article III courts and not be extended to 
Article I courts, such as the CAVC; and (3) that the unique, pro-claimant nature of 
the veterans system precluded the stringent application of a time of review provision.  
Id. at 1210–20. 
 127. Id. at 1221 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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C. Cushman v. Shinseki128 
Cushman presented the Federal Circuit with a constitutional 
question of first impression:  whether a veteran has a Fifth 
Amendment due process right to fair adjudication of a claim for 
disability benefits.129  The court held that a veteran has a 
constitutionally protected property interest in a benefits claim and 
that the VA violated Cushman’s due process rights when the agency 
based a benefits decision on an improperly altered medical record.130 
Philip Cushman served in the Marine Corps in the Vietnam War.131  
While he was in Vietnam, a sandbag fell on his back, damaging his 
spine.132  In 1974, Cushman applied for disability benefits due to his 
back injury, and received a 60% disability rating.133  In 1976, after his 
injury forced him to resign from his job at a flooring store, Cushman 
visited a VA Outpatient Clinic for reassessment of his condition.134   
In the last entry of Cushman’s medical record, the VA doctor 
describing Cushman’s back condition wrote:  “Is worse + must stop 
present type of work.”135  Cushman filed a request for total disability 
based upon individual unemployability (TDIU) in May 1977.136  The 
VA Regional Office denied the request in July 1977 and, in April 
1980, the BVA affirmed, noting that “the evidence fail[ed] to show 
the presence of symptomology which would preclude sedentary 
employment.”137  In 1982, Cushman petitioned the BVA to reconsider 
its 1980 decision.  The BVA reconsidered the decision and, based on 
the same evidentiary record, reaffirmed it.138 
In 1997, however, Cushman discovered that the medical record 
upon which the Regional Office and the BVA relied in denying his 
request for TDIU differed from the medical record on file at the VA 
Outpatient Clinic.139  Specifically, the doctor’s last entry had been 
altered to read:  “Is worse + must stop present type of work, or at least 
[] bend [] stoop lift.”140  The altered record also contained an additional 
                                        
 128. 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 129. Id. at 1292. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1292–93 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. at 1293. 
 137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The VA eventually granted Cushman 
a TDIU rating in 1994.  Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1293–94. 
 140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added by the court, brackets 
added by the court to indicate illegible or stray marks). 
  
2010] TEN 2009 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW CASES 1173 
entry stating that Cushman “says he is applying for reevaluation of 
back condition.”141  When Cushman learned of the altered record, he 
challenged the 1977 Regional Office decision and the BVA’s 1980 
and 1982 decisions as containing clear and unmistakable error.142  
After protracted proceedings, the BVA and the CAVC rejected 
Cushman’s claim of error, and he appealed to the Federal Circuit.143 
In a unanimous opinion by Judge Prost, the Federal Circuit vacated 
the decision of the CAVC.144  After rejecting the government’s motion 
for voluntary remand or, in the alternative, for mandatory 
mediation,145 the court turned to the constitutional issues:   
(i) whether a veteran, like Cushman, has a property interest in an 
unadjudicated application for benefits, and (ii) if so, whether the 
presence of the altered record violated Cushman’s due process right 
to a fundamentally fair hearing.146  As for the first issue, the court 
noted that, under established Supreme Court case law, an applicant 
for government benefits has a protected property interest if the 
applicant “ha[s] a legitimate claim of entitlement” to the benefits 
sought.147  However, the applicant does not have a protected property 
interest “if government officials may grant or deny [the application] 
in their discretion.”148  Noting that the statutes outlining the benefits 
available to veterans “provide an absolute right of benefits to qualified 
individuals,”149 the court concluded that a veteran who meets the 
eligibility criteria150 has a property interest protected by the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.151 
                                        
 141. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. Id. at 1294; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (2006) (outlining the standards for 
clear-and-unmistakable-error review). 
 143. See Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1294–95. 
 14. Id. at 1292. 
 145. See id. at 1295–96.  The court determined that a remand to the BVA for 
reconsideration of its 1980 and 1982 decisions would “not guarantee Mr. Cushman 
adequate relief” and that court-ordered mediation was not appropriate because the 
government had initially opposed mediation as an alternative to appeal.  Id. 
 146. See id. at 1296–1300. 
 147. Id. at 1297 (quoting Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 
756 (2005)) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148. Id. (quoting Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756) (emphasis added, internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 149. Id. (emphasis added); see 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006) (“For disability resulting 
from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . during a 
period of war, the United States will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was 
discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable . . . compensation 
as provided in this subchapter . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 150. As noted above, these criteria are (1) present disability; (2) in-service 
occurrence or aggravation; and (3) causal nexus between the present disability and 
the disability incurred or aggravated in service.  See supra Part I. 
 151. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297–98 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1298 
(“Veteran’s disability benefits are nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated benefits.   
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Because Cushman indisputably met the eligibility criteria for 
veteran’s benefits, the court next considered whether the VA had 
violated Cushman’s due process right to a fair adjudication of his 
claim.  Relying on both criminal and civil cases holding improper 
alteration of medical evidence to be due process violations, the court 
easily determined that the VA had violated Cushman’s Fifth 
Amendment rights.152  The court also determined that the VA’s 
consideration of the altered document was sufficiently prejudicial to 
warrant appellate relief because “[t]he altered document was the only 
piece of medical evidence that addressed Mr. Cushman’s then 
current employability.”153  The court thus vacated the CAVC’s 
decision and remanded with instructions that the BVA conduct a de 
novo review of Cushman’s 1977 TDIU request.154 
For veterans benefits practitioners, the crucial holding of Cushman 
is that a veteran has a constitutionally protected property interest in a 
claim for disability benefits.  Accordingly, even if the process used by 
the government to adjudicate benefits claims generally provides a 
constitutionally adequate process (i.e., the process is not subject to a 
facial attack), that process must still be applied in a fundamentally 
fair manner in each and every case.155  Cushman makes clear that a 
veteran whose claim for benefits was not adjudicated in a 
fundamentally fair manner—if, for example, the proceeding was 
prejudicially tainted by the admission of improper evidence or the 
suppression of favorable evidence—has a constitutional right to seek 
readjudication of the claim in a manner that satisfies due process. 
D. Holton v. Shinseki156 
Veterans who apply for disability benefits receive certain statutory 
presumptions that ease their burden of proving the essential 
elements of a disability claim.  (As noted, these essential elements 
are:  (1) a present disability, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation 
of a disease or injury, and (3) a causal relationship between the two.)  
                                        
A veteran is entitled to disability benefits upon a showing that he meets the eligibility 
requirements set forth in the governing statutes or regulations.”). 
 152. See id. at 1300 (citing Grillo v. Coughlin, 31 F.3d 53, 56–57 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. at 1299–1300 (“The procedural framework for adjudicating claims 
must be sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims in order to be 
constitutionally adequate for all.  A fundamentally fair adjudication within that 
framework, however, is constitutionally required in all cases, and not just in the large 
majority.”) (internal citation omitted, emphasis added). 
 156. 557 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
  
2010] TEN 2009 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW CASES 1175 
One presumption is that the veteran’s in-service injury occurred in 
the line of duty and was not due to the veteran’s own misconduct.157  
Another presumption is that the veteran was “of sound condition” 
(i.e., had no disease or injury) when he or she entered the military.158  
At times, veterans have tried to stretch these legal presumptions to fill 
evidentiary gaps in their claims.  Because this is a common argument, 
cases containing it normally do not garner special attention from the 
Federal Circuit.  In Holton, however, one veteran added a twist:   
He claimed that the “line of duty” presumption required the VA to 
instruct the physician conducting the medical nexus opinion to 
presume that the veteran suffered the injury in service and to state an 
opinion “only as to whether the current disability was related to that 
presumed [in-service] injury.”159  The court in Holton rejected that 
argument, however, and confirmed that the “line of duty” 
presumption does not require an  examining physician to presume 
the existence of an asserted in-service injury when providing a 
medical nexus opinion.160 
Holton was a consolidation of two appeals, those of John Holton 
and Denver Bryant, in which the CAVC affirmed the denial of their 
claims for disability compensation.161  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
the CAVC.162 
1. Holton 
Holton served in the United States Coast Guard from 1968 to 
1972.163  In 2002, he filed a claim with the VA for disability relating to 
a fractured pelvis.164  The VA Regional Office denied the claim 
because his military medical records showed no evidence of any 
pelvic injury.165  Holton brought the claim because, years after his 
service ended, he began experiencing pain in his right hip and 
buttocks.166  A 2002 x-ray showed a pelvic fracture.167  Holton surmised 
that the fracture was the result of him slipping and falling on ship 
during his service thirty years earlier.168  On appeal to the BVA, the 
                                        
 157. 38 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
 158. Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366–67. 
 159. Id. at 1368. 
 160. Id. at 1369. 
 161. Id. at 1364. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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only evidence that Holton presented to support his claim of a slip 
and fall during service was the testimony of a former Coast  
Guardsman with whom he served.169  His former shipmate testified 
that the ship they were on was frequently in heavy seas and that it was 
“highly likely” that Holton was injured on the ship.170  The BVA 
rejected the claim and Holton appealed to the CAVC.171 
The CAVC remanded (on the parties’ joint motion) to the BVA in 
order to get a “medical nexus opinion” regarding the likelihood that 
Holton’s pelvic fracture was connected to his service.172  The 
examining physician concluded that “[i]t would be speculative at best 
to say” Holton’s current injury is related to an incident that occurred 
almost thirty years ago.173  Accordingly, the Regional Office rejected 
the claim, and the BVA again affirmed, reasoning that the record 
failed to include “‘even a scintilla’ of competent medical evidence 
showing a nexus” between Holton’s current injury and his service.174  
The CAVC affirmed.175 
Holton appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the VA failed 
to apply or misinterpreted two statutory presumptions applicable to 
veterans disability claims.176  The first presumption was the “line-of-
duty” presumption codified in 38 U.S.C. § 105(a).177  It states in 
relevant part: 
An injury or disease incurred during active . . . service will be 
deemed to have been incurred in line of duty and not the result of 
the veteran’s own misconduct when the person on whose account 
benefits are claimed was, at the time the injury was suffered or 
disease contracted, in active [service], whether on active duty or on 
authorized leave, unless such injury or disease was a result of the 
person’s own willful misconduct . . . .178 
The court noted that this presumption has two important 
components.  First, it relieves the veteran of demonstrating that he or 
she was “at work” when the injury occurred.179  So long as he or she 
was in active status, “a service member’s workday never ends.”180  
                                        
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1365. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1366. 
 176. Id. 
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Second, it relieves the veteran of the burden to demonstrate that he 
or she was not engaged in misconduct at the time of the injury.181  
Rather, the VA must present evidence to rebut the presumption.182 
The second relevant statutory presumption was the “presumption 
of sound condition.”183  This presumption relieves the veteran of the 
burden of proving that he or she was healthy at the time of joining 
the military.184  This obviously is most beneficial to a person who 
begins to show symptoms of an injury or illness while on active duty 
because there can be no conclusion other than that the injury or 
illness occurred while on active duty. 
The court rejected Holton’s attempts to stretch both presumptions 
to establish his claim for benefits.  It held that neither presumption 
relieves veterans from demonstrating that their current disability is 
related to an in-service injury or disease, as Holton failed to do.185  
“While the section 105(a) presumption establishes that an injury or 
disease that was incurred during service was incurred in the line of 
duty, it is irrelevant to the question whether that in-service injury or 
disease is causally related to the veteran’s current disability.”186  
Holton’s arguments that the VA did not properly apply these 
presumptions to his claim were not novel ones.  The court has 
addressed similar arguments in recent years.187  The court has 
consistently held that “if a claimant does not show ‘a causal 
relationship between his in-service and post-service medical 
problems,’ the section 105(a) presumption ‘cannot fill that gap and, 
therefore, is irrelevant.’”188 
As noted, Holton added a twist to his presumption argument.   
He claimed that the § 105(a) presumption requires the VA to instruct 
the physician conducting the medical nexus opinion to presume that 
Holton suffered a pelvis injury while in-service and then to offer an 
                                        
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 241, 244 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992) 
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 184. Holton, 557 F.3d at 1367. 
 185. Id. at 1369. 
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opinion solely as to whether his current injury is related to the 
presumed in-service injury.189  The court disagreed, noting that the 
VA has a duty to provide a medical examination but that nothing 
requires that the physician “presume the existence of an asserted  
in-service injury when providing a medical nexus opinion.”190 
2. Bryant 
Holton also addressed the appeal of Denver Bryant, who served on 
active duty in the United States Army from 1943 to 1963.191  In 1962, 
an ophthalmologist examined Bryant because he complained of eye 
irritation and seeing halos around lights.192  During the exam, the 
only evidence that there was anything wrong came from a tonometer 
measurement that showed “increased intra-ocular pressure in both 
eyes.”193  The physician noted in his medical record, however, that the 
tonometer appeared to be defective.194  Nevertheless, because no 
other tonometer was available, Bryant was diagnosed with acute 
glaucoma.195  Just one week later, however, another tonometer was 
available, and the physician concluded that Bryant did not have 
glaucoma.196  Further, there was no evidence of glaucoma in Bryant’s 
exit physical from the Army or during exams for the next two 
decades.197  In 1990, however, a VA physician diagnosed Bryant with 
“uncontrolled open-angle glaucoma.”198 
In 1996, based on that diagnosis, Bryant filed a claim for disability 
compensation with the VA.199  He pointed to the 1962 glaucoma 
diagnosis as evidence of an in-service disease.200  The Regional Office 
and BVA denied his claim, reasoning that the original diagnosis was 
due to the faulty tonometer.201  Bryant appealed to the CAVC and 
argued that the BVA either misinterpreted or failed to apply the 
statutory presumptions discussed above.202 
Bryant argued that “it is enough for a veteran to put forth some 
evidence of an in-service injury or disease—no matter how little or 
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how credible—to trigger section 105(a).”203  The court disagreed, 
citing Madden v. Gober.204  Madden addressed 38 U.S.C. § 1112, which 
states that, if a veteran has symptoms of certain chronic diseases 
within one year after leaving the military, it is presumed that the 
veteran contracted the disease while in active service.205  The veteran 
in Madden, similar to Bryant, argued that “any” evidence put forth 
should trigger the service connection presumption.206  The Madden 
court disagreed, and held that the BVA must evaluate the cumulative 
evidence.207  The Holton court applied the same principle and ruled 
that “[s]ection 105(a) cannot serve as a substitute for affirmative 
evidence that a veteran incurred an injury or disease during 
service.”208 
E. Amberman v. Shinseki209 
Amberman presented the Federal Circuit with a rare opportunity to 
interpret 38 C.F.R. § 4.14,210 which addresses the VA’s practice of 
“pyramiding”—combining the rating for multiple disabilities that 
have the same symptoms, rather than separately rating those similar 
disabilities.211  In Amberman, the court held that, on the facts 
presented, the VA properly refused to assign separate ratings for 
bipolar affective disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
because of the overlapping symptoms of the two disabilities.212 
Patricia Amberman served on active duty in the Army from 1977 to 
1980.213  In 1993, the VA assigned her a 30% disability rating for 
bipolar affective disorder.214  After six additional years of proceedings 
at the VA, the BVA granted Amberman service connection for 
PTSD.215  On remand, the Regional Office assigned a 70% disability 
rating for bipolar disorder and a separate, noncompensable rating 
for PTSD.216  After another appeal to the BVA and another remand, 
“the [Regional Office] determined that it had committed clear and 
                                        
 203. Id. at 1370. 
 204. Id. (citing Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 205. 38 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006). 
 206. Madden, 125 F.3d at 1480. 
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unmistakable error by rating the two disorders separately.”217  
Accordingly, the Regional Office rated the disorders together and 
assigned a 70% disability rating.218  The BVA affirmed in relevant part, 
holding that the lack of “distinguished manifestations” between 
Amberman’s bipolar disorder and PTSD justified the combined 
rating.219  Because separate (and sufficiently severe) ratings for 
Amberman’s two disorders could have entitled her to special monthly 
compensation, she appealed to the Federal Circuit.220 
In a unanimous opinion by Judge Gajarsa, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed.221  The court first acknowledged the general rule that 
“separately diagnosed injuries are rated individually . . . then 
combined into a single [disability] rating” “based on the entire 
person of the veteran.”222  The court noted, however, that 38 C.F.R.  
§ 4.14 sets forth an exception to that general rule.223  Section 4.14 
states that “[t]he evaluation of the same disability under various 
diagnoses is to be avoided.”224  In other words, as the court explained, 
section 4.14 “caution[s] against making multiple awards for the same 
physical impairment simply because that impairment could be 
labeled in different ways.”225  Amberman’s primary argument on 
appeal was that bipolar affective disorder and PTSD are not  
“the same disability” under section 4.14 and therefore should be 
rated separately.226 
Emphasizing that “[i]t is the veteran’s overall disability that is 
relevant,”227 the court endorsed the CAVC’s holding in Esteban v. 
Brown228 that “two defined diagnoses constitute the same disability for 
purposes of section 4.14 if they have overlapping symptomology.”229  
Turning to Amberman’s case, the court noted that “the Veterans 
Court found that there were no manifestations of one mental 
disorder that were not also manifestations of the other.”230  In other 
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words, the two disorders had completely “overlapping symptomology” 
and therefore “constitue[d] the same disability for purposes of 
section 4.14.231  This determination by the CAVC was a factual finding 
that the Federal Circuit was not permitted to disturb.232  Thus, the 
court affirmed the combined rating for bipolar disorder and PTSD.233 
For veterans benefits practitioners, it is important to note that the 
Federal Circuit’s holding does not preclude bipolar disorder and 
PTSD from being assigned separate ratings in an appropriate case.  
The Federal Circuit made clear that decisions about pyramiding are 
to be made on a case-by-case basis, and it explicitly acknowledged that 
“bipolar affective disorder and PTSD could have different symptoms 
and it could therefore be improper in some circumstances for the VA 
to treat these separately diagnosed conditions as producing only the 
same disability.”234  Thus, a practitioner whose client suffers from 
multiple disabilities that can have overlapping symptoms is wise to 
develop a factual record that emphasizes the divergent manifestations 
of those disabilities in his or her particular client.  Under Amberman, a 
record of “different symptoms”235 or “distinguished manifestations”236 
could justify separate ratings for each disability, and possibly 
enhanced benefits for the veteran. 
F. Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki237 
This case related to the type of notice that the VA must provide 
when it denies a benefits claim.  The court consolidated the appeals 
of two veterans, Angel Vazquez-Flores and Michael Schultz, who 
applied to the VA for an increase in their disability ratings.238  The VA 
and BVA denied their claims, but the CAVC held that the VA failed to 
provide adequate notice and remanded both cases.239  The VA 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which vacated the CAVC decision.240 
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1. Vazquez-Flores 
Vazquez-Flores served on active duty in the United States Army 
from 1963 to 1965 and again from 1966 to 1969.241  After he was 
discharged, he received a 30% disability rating for nephrolithiasis 
(i.e., kidney stones)—the maximum rating for kidney stones under 
the VA’s diagnostic manual.242  It is possible however, for a veteran to 
use other, similar codes to obtain a higher rating.  For example, even 
though kidney stones can only receive a maximum of 30%, 
nephrolithiasis can, in certain circumstances, be classified as 
“hydronephrosis,” which when severe can in turn be classified as 
“renal dysfunction.”243  If hypertension causes renal dysfunction,  
it can be rated anywhere from 40% to 60%.244 
In 1994, Vazquez-Flores filed a claim to increase his rating, which 
the VA denied.245  Vazquez-Flores appealed to the BVA, which denied 
his appeal and found that the notice the VA provided to Vazquez-
Flores regarding its denial of his claim was sufficient.246  The notice 
referenced diagnostic codes for nephrolithiasis, hydronephrosis, and 
renal dysfunction, but not hypertension.247  He then appealed to the 
CAVC, where he argued that the VA’s notice was deficient because it 
failed to inform him that he could seek to codify his illness under a 
different code and thus potentially be eligible for a higher rating.248  
The CAVC held that the VA failed to properly notify Vazquez-Flores 
because it did not tell him how to substantiate a claim for an 
increased rating and because the notice was generally “confusing.”249 
2. Schultz 
Schultz served on active duty during the 1980s and 1990s and 
received a 20% disability rating for a right shoulder injury, and a 10% 
disability rating for a disability in both knees.250  In 1997, he applied 
for an increased rating but the VA denied his claim.251  The VA 
notified Schultz of the denial and informed him that, in order to 
receive a higher rating, he must submit evidence that his injury had 
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“become worse or more disabling.”252  Schultz underwent additional 
medical exams and resubmitted his claim to the BVA, which denied 
his claim and found that the VA’s notice was sufficient.253  Schultz 
appealed to the CAVC, which relied on Vazquez-Flores’s case254 in 
holding that the VA failed to provide sufficient notice under 38 
U.S.C. § 5103(a) because the notice “did not inform [Schultz] that he 
should submit evidence describing the effects of his worsened 
condition on his employability and daily life.”255  Moreover, the CAVC 
reasoned that the notice should have informed Schultz that his knee 
injury could be evaluated under codes that assigned ratings for 
“limitation of motion” or other factors, even though his initial rating 
did not reference any other codes.256 
3. On appeal 
a. Notice 
The Federal Circuit began with the CAVC’s holding regarding what 
constituted sufficient notice.  The CAVC held that a proper notice 
should include: 
[A] review of the previously assigned [disability code] and disability 
rating, and a commonsense assessment whether the criteria for a 
higher rating under the assigned or a cross-referenced [disability 
code] includes criteria that would not be satisfied by the claimant 
demonstrating a noticeable worsening or increase in severity of the 
disability and the effect of that worsening . . . on the claimant’s 
employment and daily life (such as a specific measurement or test 
result).  If it does, then general notice of that criteria must be 
provided to the claimant.257 
In other words, the VA would have to give veterans notice of 
alternate disability codes that could potentially apply to them and 
explain to veterans how to prove the codes’ applicability. 
The VA appealed both cases because, it argued, such a 
requirement would essentially require the VA to review each veteran’s 
case at a level of detail that is not required by Federal Circuit 
decisions in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs258 
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and Wilson v. Manfield.259  The VA would have to think of every 
conceivable diagnostic code that the veteran could apply for, and 
then tell the veteran how to satisfy that particular code and every 
medical test that the veteran could take to prove his or her condition 
had worsened.260 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the VA, holding that Wilson and 
Paralyzed Veterans “put to rest the notion” that the VA is required to 
provide notice that is “veteran-specific.”261  Rather, the VA need only 
provide a generic notice that is “claim-specific” (i.e., depending 
whether the claim is an initial claim for benefits or a claim for an 
increased rating).  In the court’s view, this claim-specific notice need 
only inform the veteran why the claim was rejected and provide an 
opportunity to submit additional evidence.262 
b. Daily life  
In addition to appealing the CAVC’s holding that sufficient notice 
should include alternative diagnostic code criteria, the VA also 
appealed the CAVC’s holding that proper notice should include 
evidence regarding how the veteran’s disability affects his or her 
“daily life.”263  The CAVC held:  “[T]he Secretary [must] notify the 
claimant that, to substantiate a claim, the claimant must provide, or 
ask the Secretary to obtain . . . evidence demonstrating a 
worsening . . . of the disability and the effect that worsening has on 
the claimant’s employment and daily life.”264 
The VA argued that the “daily life” requirement is inconsistent with 
the statute, which requires the VA to rate disabilities based on a 
veteran’s average reduced capacity to earn a living in the civilian 
world.265  Moreover, the VA argued that Congress never defined 
“disability,” and thus the VA’s interpretation of the term should 
receive Chevron deference.266  The VA has defined “disability” to mean 
“impairment in earning capacity.”267 
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The veterans countered that the “daily life” requirement is 
contained in 38 C.F.R. § 4.10, which states that the “basis of disability 
evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole . . . to function under 
the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment.”268 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the VA, reasoning that the portion 
of regulations that use the term “daily life” govern “policies and 
procedures for conducting VA medical examinations,” which are not 
considered part of the ratings schedule because “the rating schedule 
consists only of those regulations that establish disabilities and set 
forth the terms under which compensation shall be provided.”269  
“Thus, while the effects of a disability . . . are arguably relevant to a 
doctor conducting a medical examination, those effects are not 
relevant to a disability rating made by a ratings specialist.”270 
In sum, Vazquez-Flores holds that notice under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) 
need not be veteran-specific.271  Accordingly, the VA need not suggest 
every potential disability code or list every possible medical test that a 
veteran could procure to prove his claim.  Rather, it need only be a 
generic notice that tells the veteran “why his claim was rejected and 
[provides] an opportunity to submit additional relevant evidence.”272  
Likewise, the VA need not consider how a veteran’s disability affects 
his or her “daily life” unless it affects the ability to earn a living.273 
The court’s holding illustrates two important points for 
practitioners.  First, despite the VA’s duty to assist a veteran with his 
or her claim, no veteran or veteran’s attorney should rely on the VA 
for research or presume that what the VA says is the only answer.  
Rather, veterans and attorneys should research the diagnostic codes 
to see if the veteran’s disability can be codified under an alternate 
code or cross-referenced.  Second, if a veteran’s disability impacts his 
or her daily life, the time to bring that up is during the medical exam.  
In the context of a claim, any reference to how the disability impacts 
the veteran’s daily life must be closely tied to the veteran’s reduced 
capacity to earn a living. 
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G. Moore v. Shinseki274 
In Moore, the Federal Circuit examined the VA’s duty to assist 
veterans with their claims pursuant to the VCAA.  Specifically, the 
court addressed the VA’s obligation to obtain relevant medical 
records.275  The Federal Circuit vacated the decision of the CAVC, 
which had affirmed the BVA.276 
Dwayne Moore served on active duty from May 1988 to February 
1991.277  During his service, he was admitted to a psychiatric hospital 
for lacerating his own wrists.278  A psychiatrist diagnosed him with  
“a severe personality disorder which render[ed] him a danger to 
himself and/or others” and recommended an “expeditious” 
separation from the service.279  In 1992, Moore filed a claim for 
disability related to his psychiatric disorder, which the VA denied.280  
In 1996, one VA examiner concluded that “the event leading up to 
the veteran’s discharge was a single episode that was now resolved.”281  
In 1999, however, the VA assigned Moore a 10% disability rating 
(based on the 1996 examination) retroactive to September 16, 
1992.282  Moore appealed to the BVA, which in 2004 assigned him a 
rating of 30% from January 1997 to August 7, 2002 and 50% from 
August 8, 2002 onward.283  The BVA concluded, however, that he did 
not rate higher than 10% from 1992 to January 1997 because  
“he suffered from only ‘mild social and industrial impairment’ during 
that period.”284 
Moore appealed all of his ratings to the CAVC, arguing that the 
VA, before making any determination with respect to his disability 
rating, had an “affirmative obligation, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, 
to obtain the medical records” from the psychiatric hospital to which 
he was committed while he was on active duty.285  The CAVC 
disagreed, reasoning that even if the VA had obtained the records, 
they would not have helped.286  Moreover, the issue as the CAVC saw 
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it was not the records when Moore was hospitalized, but his condition 
from September 1992 (his discharge) forward.287  The CAVC also 
pointed out that the record included a “description of [Moore’s]  
in-service symptoms,” which had been prepared within two weeks 
after he left the psychiatric ward, and that Moore had failed to show 
how the missing records would be “meaningfully different” from what 
the VA already had in its possession.288  Judge Kasold dissented, 
reasoning that the psychiatric hospital records were “relevant on their 
face” and should have been obtained and reviewed prior to the VA 
making a determination.289 
Moore appealed to the Federal Circuit, again arguing that § 5103A 
required the VA to get his medical records from the psychiatric 
hospital before rendering a disability determination, and that the VA 
misinterpreted § 5103A in finding his past medical records 
irrelevant.290  The court agreed with Moore and attacked the CAVC’s 
reasoning that “the only pertinent issue was the degree of Moore’s 
disability after September 16, 1992” and that the psychiatric hospital 
records “were not relevant because they pre-dated the period for 
which he sought disability compensation.”291  For support, the court 
cited the VA’s own regulations, which specifically require the VA “to 
assess a disability in ‘relation to its history.’”292  “Over a period of 
many years, a veteran’s disability claim may require reratings in 
accordance with changes in . . . physical or mental condition.  It is 
thus essential . . . that each disability be viewed in relation to its 
history.”293  The court explained that consideration of an illness’s 
entire history is “particularly important in the context of psychiatric 
disorders ‘[because they] abate and recur.’”294  Accordingly, when 
rating a veteran with psychiatric disorders, the VA must base its 
decision on “all the evidence of record that bears on occupational 
and social impairment rather than solely on the examiner’s 
assessment of the level of disability at the moment of examination.”295 
In response to the government’s argument that not getting the 
record constituted harmless error, the court noted that the VCAA 
requires the VA to “obtain all of the veteran’s relevant service medical 
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records.”296  The record, the court noted, did not demonstrate that 
the VA made any effort to get Moore’s records from the psychiatric 
hospital.297  The court also was not pleased that at oral argument, 
Moore’s counsel advised the court that he had obtained the missing 
records that day and that they had been “‘lost in the bowels’ of the 
National Personnel Records Center.”298  This revelation prompted the 
court to note that “[b]ecause many veterans lack the knowledge and 
resources necessary to locate relevant records, Congress has 
appropriately placed the burden on the VA to ensure that all relevant 
service medical records are obtained and fully evaluated.”299   
The court did not stop there:  “It is shameful that the VA yet again 
failed in its duty to assist the veteran and, at best, poor judgment by 
the Department of Justice in defending the VA’s actions.”300 
Similar to its “harmless error” argument, the government argued 
that, even if it had obtained Moore’s psychiatric hospital records,  
he would not have received a higher rating.301  However, the court 
“fail[ed] to understand how the government, without examining the 
[psychiatric hospital] records, can have any idea as to whether they 
would, or would not, support Moore’s claim for an increased 
disability rating.”302  The court agreed with Judge Kasold’s CAVC 
dissent that the records were “relevant on their face” because they 
pertained to his current disability.303  “Such records could potentially 
call into question the VA’s conclusion that Moore suffered from only 
‘mild social and industrial impairment’ and was therefore entitled to 
no more than a 10 percent disability rating in the period after 
September 1992.”304 
Moore illustrates important points about obtaining records.   
First, the court’s insistence that the actual records be obtained as 
opposed to relying on a summary of those records demonstrates how 
important the records are in deciding claims.  The leading treatise 
for veterans benefits practitioners states that obtaining records is  
“the most important factor” to being an effective advocate.305  In some 
cases, the obstacle to obtaining that information is that the VA tried 
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but could not locate the records.  Moore was unique in that the VA:  
(1) did not attempt to locate the records; (2) argued that it had no 
duty to locate the records; and (3) argued that the records were 
irrelevant.  Second, practitioners should be aware of record 
“summaries.”  The VA relies heavily on “summaries” of records 
because it has so many cases to adjudicate.  But just like in the 
“telephone” game, potentially important information gets left out or 
altered every time someone summarizes a medical record.  
Accordingly, veterans and their attorneys should insist that the 
originals be obtained (and should look for them on their own, as 
Moore’s counsel did), and should read them thoroughly to ensure 
that the summaries do not omit material information. 
H. Walch v. Shinseki306 
While Moore addresses what actions VA is required to affirmatively 
take to fulfill the duty to assist, Walch demonstrates the limitations on 
that duty.  In Walch, the Federal Circuit held that the VA’s duty does 
not extend to forwarding sua sponte certain medical evidence to a 
veteran’s private physician if the veteran is also in possession of that 
evidence.307 
Richard Walch served on active duty from 1954 to 1957.308  Walch’s 
military medical records indicated that during his service he was 
treated for injuries to his left knee on two occasions.309  His discharge 
physical, however, showed that his knee had healed.310  This was also 
the conclusion shortly after Walch was discharged and when he filed 
for disability compensation related to his left knee.311  The VA denied 
the claim because it found “no orthopedic condition.”312  Walch did 
not appeal, making the decision final.  In 1966, Walch injured his left 
knee and broke his tibia during a softball game.313  His prognosis was 
“generally good,” but the doctor noted the “possibility of long-term 
arthritis in the [left] knee.”314 
In 1992, Walch sought to reopen his claim.315  He submitted 
evidence from private physicians who had treated him for left knee 
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problems over the years including moderate degenerative arthritis 
and a total knee replacement, and the hospital report from his 1966 
softball injury.316  In deciding to reopen Walch’s claim, the BVA relied 
on a letter from Walch’s physician that concluded that there was a 
likelihood that Walch’s current osteoarthritis was connected to his 
two in-service knee injuries.317  It submitted his reopened case to the 
VA Regional Office for further development and assigned one of its 
physicians, Dr. James Burton, to review the case.318 
After reviewing the file, Dr. Burton concluded that there was a 
greater than 50% chance that Walch’s osteoarthritis was related to 
the traumatic injury he incurred in 1966 while playing softball and 
not a greater than 50% chance that it was related to his two in-service 
knee injuries.319  He presented this conclusion in a six-page report in 
which he summarized all of the relevant medical evidence.320  Walch’s 
private physician, Dr. Michael Sousa, also submitted a letter to the 
BVA that the BVA found lacking on several grounds.321  Although his 
letter mentioned Walch’s two in-service injuries, it did not describe 
them.322  Moreover, Dr. Sousa failed to consider Walch’s traumatic 
softball injury.323  Accordingly, the BVA relied on Dr. Burton’s 
opinion and denied Walch’s claim.324  Walch appealed to the CAVC.325 
On appeal, Walch argued that the VA had a duty to sua sponte 
forward his entire claim file to his private physician, Dr. Sousa, before 
giving more weight to Dr. Burton’s opinion.326  The CAVC disagreed.  
It conceded that if Dr. Sousa had stated that he could not provide a 
complete analysis without such records, the VA might have been 
obligated to send him the file—but this had not occurred.327  
Moreover, the BVA assigned less weight to Dr. Sousa’s opinion 
because he failed to mention the traumatic softball injury, which was 
detailed in private medical records that Walch either had or could 
have released to Dr. Sousa without any assistance from the VA.328 
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Walch appealed to the Federal Circuit, where he argued that the 
CAVC misinterpreted the VA’s duty to assist veterans with their claims 
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)–(c)329 by holding that the VA does 
not have a duty to sua sponte forward all medical records in its 
possession to a veteran’s private physician.330 
The court disagreed with Walch, viewing his argument as trying to 
extend § 5103A too far.331  Section 5103A(a)(1) obliges the VA to 
“make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence 
necessary to substantiate the claimant’s claim.”332  That includes 
obtaining the veteran’s military medical record, records from 
treatment they received at VA hospitals, or other relevant records 
held by the federal government.333  It also extends to private records 
that the claimant authorizes the VA to obtain.334  It does not, however, 
“require the VA to provide the veteran with evidence that is already in 
his possession” because “[t]he VA’s duty to assist is not an 
unbounded obligation.”335 
Walch leaves no doubt that, despite the VA’s long list of statutory 
obligations to assist veterans with their claims, there are limits.   
The facts of Walch were such that the VA was able to obtain a strongly-
worded opinion limiting its obligations.336 
However, there will likely be cases that test Walch’s holding.  It is 
not difficult to imagine scenarios where active duty service members 
and veterans receive treatment from private physicians but it is 
unclear who has which records.  For example, if a service member 
gets sick while on vacation and is not near a military hospital, he or 
she is authorized to get treatment at the nearest emergency room.  
Many times, those private records do not become part of the service 
member’s military medical record.  Similarly, if a service member or 
veteran requires treatment that is not available at certain bases or VA 
hospitals, he or she will often be referred to a civilian physician with 
the required skill set.  Again, those private records may fall through 
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the cracks and not become part of the veteran’s military records.   
In such cases, if the veteran has those records in his or her 
possession, Walch holds that the VA has no duty to sua sponte obtain 
those records and provide them to the veteran’s private physician.  
However, unless the veteran submits the records to the VA as part of 
his claims file, it is unclear how the VA will determine whether the 
veteran in fact has the records. 
I. Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v. Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs337 
As noted above, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction not 
only over appeals from decisions of the CAVC, but also over petitions 
for review challenging VA regulations, rules, and statements of 
policy.338  These petitions for review are governed by the standards of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).339  In Purple Heart, the 
Federal Circuit granted a petition for review and vacated a VA rule 
that subjected certain large awards to enhanced scrutiny without the 
knowledge or participation of the veteran.340 
On August 27, 2007, the VA issued a directive, “Fast Letter 07-19,” 
to all Regional Offices.341  The directive applied to Regional Office 
decisions that either (a) awarded lump sums of $250,000 or more or 
(b) had a retroactive effective date of eight years or more.342   
It required these so-called “Extraordinary Awards” to be sent to the 
director of the Compensation and Pension (C&P) Service for “final 
determination.”343  In addition, the directive stated that the Regional 
Office decision granting the extraordinary award should not be 
disclosed to the veteran, that the veteran should not be told that the 
C&P review occurred, and that the veteran should not be told if the 
C&P Service reduced the original award.344  Veterans organizations 
petitioned the Federal Circuit for direct review.345  They argued that 
the C&P procedure was contrary to law and therefore invalid under 
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the APA346 because it excluded the veteran from knowing about and 
participating in the proceeding, and because the VA adopted the 
procedure without public notice and an opportunity for comment.347 
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge 
Newman, granted the petition and set aside the C&P review 
procedure.348  The court first rejected two threshold arguments raised 
by the VA.  First, the VA contended that the petition was moot 
because the VA had since issued a new directive, “Fast Letter 08-24,” 
which altered some of the terminology used in the original 
directive.349  However, because the C&P review procedure from the 
original directive was unchanged, the court ruled that the petition 
was not moot.350  In addition, the VA asserted that the new C&P 
procedure was not subject to Federal Circuit review because it was not 
a “rule” as defined in the APA.351  But the court rejected this 
argument, too, writing that the procedural change at issue was  
“a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and 
obligations,” and was therefore a “rule” subject to judicial review.352 
Turning to the substance of the challenge, three VA regulations 
weighed heavily on the court’s determination that the C&P review 
process was contrary to law and therefore invalid: 
• 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a), which provides claimants with, among 
other things, the right to a hearing, and imposes on the VA 
“the obligation . . . to assist a claimant in developing the facts 
pertinent to the claim”; 
• 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(1), which entitles a claimant “to a 
hearing at any time on any issue involved in a claim” before a 
VA employee with “original determinative authority” over the 
issue involved; and 
• 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2), which explains that the purpose of 
the hearing under subsection (c)(1) is to provide the 
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claimant with an opportunity to present additional pertinent 
evidence and arguments “in person.”353 
The court first noted that, under the new C&P procedure,  
“the veteran does not have a hearing in the presence of the persons 
who now have final decisional authority for regional office decisions,” 
in direct contravention of subsection (c)(1).354  Because of the lack of 
hearing, and because the veteran would not be told of any reduction 
in the award resulting from C&P review, the court also determined 
that the new procedure deprived the veteran of his right under 
subsection (c)(2) to present additional evidence and arguments in 
support of his claim.355  In addition, the court emphasized that the 
new procedure did not provide “in person” interaction with the 
“deciding official,” i.e., the C&P reviewer, as required by subsection 
(c)(2).356  Finally, the court rejected the argument that the C&P 
procedure was permitted by 38 U.S.C. § 5109A, which permits the VA 
to challenge any decision of the Regional Office.357  The court 
observed that review under § 5109A is for “clear and unmistakable 
error” only, whereas the C&P procedure “require[d] no deference to 
the regional office.”358  The court thus concluded that the new C&P 
procedure was “not in accordance with law,”359 granted the petition 
for review, and vacated the procedure set forth in Fast Letters 07-19 
and 08-24.360 
Judge Schall concurred in the court’s ruling that the petition was 
not moot, but dissented from the remainder of Judge Newman’s 
opinion.  He first contended that the “extraordinary award 
procedure” (EAP) set forth in the Fast Letters was “a rule of agency 
procedure, which is exempted from notice and comment 
requirements” by the APA.361  Judge Schall also viewed the EAP 
procedure as consistent with § 5109A because that section, in his 
view, applies the clear-and-unmistakable-error standard only to final 
decisions of the Regional Office, and does not preclude “de novo 
internal review of draft rating decisions.”362  Finally, Judge Schall 
                                        
 353. See id. at 1296–97 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (2009). 
 354. Id. at 1297. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 360. Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1297–98. 
 361. Id. at 1298–99 (Schall, J., dissenting); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (providing that 
public notice is not required for “rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice”). 
 362. Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1299 (Schall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
  
2010] TEN 2009 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW CASES 1195 
contended that the EAP procedure was not contrary to the governing 
regulations because (i) the veteran retained the right to a hearing 
before the Regional Office; (ii) this hearing would still occur  
“in person”; and (iii) the VA’s duty to assist was unhampered, as the 
Regional Office could still explain the issue and suggest that the 
veteran submit additional evidence.363 
However, the difficulty with the position adopted by Judge Schall is 
that, as he acknowledged, “the policy guidance provided by the C&P 
Service . . . apparently binds the Regional Office.”364  So, after the 
C&P Service has reduced an award, any in-person hearing before the 
Regional Office is relatively meaningless—any “decision-making 
authority” retained by the Regional Office after C&P review is largely 
pro forma.365  While the Regional Office could certainly still “suggest 
the submission of additional evidence . . . which would be of 
advantage to the claimant’s position,” any subsequent “extraordinary” 
award based on this additional evidence would return to the C&P 
Service for further review.366  So, while it could be argued that the 
veteran’s ongoing interaction with the Regional Office satisfies the 
letter of section 3.103(c)(1)’s requirement of an “in person” hearing 
before a VA employee who has “original determinative authority,” 
that section’s spirit is certainly unfulfilled when the actual decision-
making authority rests with the C&P Service. 
Although the Federal Circuit has rejected the VA’s first effort at 
heightening the scrutiny given to large awards as both procedurally 
and substantively flawed, the VA is certainly free to correct the errors 
identified by the court and to try to implement, through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, a process for reviewing extraordinary awards 
that complies with the law.  Given that the pre-Purple Heart C&P 
review process resulted in the reduction of proposed benefits in the 
“vast majority” of cases subject to review,367 practitioners should be 
mindful of the possibility for future rulemaking on this topic, and 
should regularly monitor the Federal Register for new rules and 
regulations published by the VA.368 
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J. Reizenstein v. Shinseki369 
Reizenstein presented another question of administrative law.   
It addressed a VA regulation governing the reduction of total 
disability ratings.  The VA had interpreted this regulation as 
inapplicable in the context of total disability ratings awarded as part 
of a retrospective staged rating.370  The court in Reizenstein considered 
whether the VA’s position was properly entitled to Chevron 
deference,371 and, if so, whether the VA’s interpretation of the 
regulation was reasonable.  The Federal Circuit determined that the 
VA’s position was entitled to deference and that the agency’s 
interpretation was reasonable.372 
Reizenstein served on active duty in three branches of the armed 
forces at intermittent periods between 1968 and 1981.373  In 1996, 
Reizenstein filed a benefits claim for post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD).374  The VA denied this claim in 1997 but, following treatment 
at a VA medical center in 1998, Reizenstein was diagnosed with a 
number of conditions, including PTSD.375  Reizenstein thereafter 
appealed his 1997 denial and the VA retroactively assigned a 30% 
disability rating beginning in November 1996.376  Reizenstein 
appealed this decision and the BVA awarded him a retrospective 
staged award in March 2006.377  In relevant part, this retrospective 
award afforded Reizenstein a 100% disability rating from March 22, 
1998, to May 5, 1999, but then reduced the rating to 30% from May 
6, 1999 through the present.378  The BVA premised its decision to 
reduce the disability rating on a May 6, 1999 mental health treatment 
note that documented a reduction in the severity of Reizenstein’s 
condition.379  Reizeinstein again challenged the BVA’s decision on 
several grounds, one of which was the apparent conflict between the 
May 6, 1999 reduction from a 100% disability rating and a VA 
regulation, 38 C.F.R § 3.343(a), which forbids reductions from total 
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disability ratings without a medical examination:  “Total disability 
ratings, when warranted by the severity of the condition and not 
granted purely because of hospital, surgical, or home treatment,  
or individual unemployability will not be reduced, in the absence of 
clear error, without examination showing material improvement in 
physical or mental condition.”380 
On appeal, the CAVC noted that the VA enacted section 3.343(a) 
to protect veterans who were completely dependent on disability 
benefits from arbitrary reductions.381  The CAVC held that it would 
not advance that purpose to apply the regulation in the context of 
staged ratings, which provide retrospective lump-sum payments.   
The CAVC therefore determined that section 3.343(a) did not apply 
to Reizenstein’s claim.382 
The Federal Circuit affirmed.383  It found that section 3.343(a), as 
an interpretation by the VA of its own regulations, was entitled to 
broad deference, even greater than that typically afforded to an 
agency’s construction of a statute.384  Under this framework, the court 
found the government’s interpretation of section 3.343(a) to be 
reasonable.385 
The holding of Reizenstein should put practitioners of veterans law 
on notice that challenges to retroactive reductions of total disability 
ratings are difficult to establish.  More generally, it illustrates the 
difficulty of challenging VA interpretations of the department’s own 
regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court decided many 
important veterans law cases in 2009.  In Sanders, the Supreme Court 
made a rare but significant foray into the field, holding that it is the 
veteran’s burden, not the VA’s, to prove that the VA’s failure to 
provide notice was prejudicial.  The Federal Circuit decided a wide 
range of legal questions, holding, inter alia, that veterans have a Fifth 
Amendment due process right to a claim for benefits; that there is no 
equitable tolling of the 120-day deadline to appeal a BVA decision to 
the CAVC; that the VA need not provide separate ratings for diseases 
with overlapping symptoms; and that the VA need not provide notice 
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that is specific to each veteran.  Also, under various fact patterns, the 
court elaborated on the VA’s statutory duty to assist veterans in 
developing their claims.  In the years to come, an aging population of 
veterans from the Korean and Vietnam Wars, as well as veterans from 
the on-going military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, will continue to 
present the Federal Circuit with challenging and significant questions 
of veterans benefits law. 
